Theory and experiment in cognitive science  by Thagard, Paul
Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 1104–1106
www.elsevier.com/locate/artint
Theory and experiment in cognitive science
Paul Thagard
University of Waterloo, Canada
Available online 11 October 2007
Abstract
Margaret Boden’s Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science is a masterfully broad and informative history of compu-
tational theories of mental operations. However, its relative neglect of research in psychology and neuroscience yields a somewhat
misleading picture of cognitive science, which ideally combines theory and experiment.
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In science, experiment without theory is blind, but theory without experiment is empty. Artificial intelligence has
made many theoretical contributions to the interdisciplinary field of cognitive science, which also encompasses psy-
chology, neuroscience, linguistics, anthropology, and philosophy. Until the 1950s when AI emerged, there was no
plausible explanation of how high-level cognitive functions such as problem solving could be carried out mechanisti-
cally. The idea of mind as machine is ancient, going back to the Greek and Roman atomists, but the idea only turned
into a scientific hypothesis with the development in the 1940s and 1950s of modern ideas of computation. Since then,
there have been major theoretical developments about mind and computation coming not only from AI but also from
cognitive psychology and computational neuroscience. Cognitive science, however, has advanced not only theoret-
ically, but also experimentally, through the development of new techniques such as reaction time measurements in
cognitive psychology and brain scanning instruments in neuroscience.
Margaret Boden’s history of cognitive science, Mind as Machine [1], is a magisterial review of major theoretical
developments about mental computation, but falls short in not tying these developments more closely to the exper-
imental study of mind. First let me review its major accomplishments. In 2 volumes, 17 chapters, and more than
1600 pages, Boden provides an astonishingly comprehensive and insightful review of the attempts by computer scien-
tists, philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, linguists, and neuroscientists to understand the mental mechanisms
that underlie thought. The three chapters (around 300 pages) on mainstream artificial intelligence constitute the best
available history of the field from its beginnings to today. Boden provides a balanced and accurate view of both the
successes and difficulties of research in AI.
Moreover, anyone interested in computational understanding of mind will enjoy learning from chapters on philo-
sophical and cybernetic precursors of AI, computational psychology, connectionism, neuroscience, and essential
philosophical issues. With an engaging style and frequent cross references that make valuable conceptual connec-
tions, Boden has provided a highly personal but intellectually indispensable review of theoretical cognitive science.
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a participant in Harvard’s path breaking Center for Cognitive Studies, and she has drawn richly on her decades of in-
volvement in work on computational psychology, artificial intelligence, and philosophical foundations. The breadth of
scholarship—more than 5000 references across many different fields—is astonishing. Anyone with a serious interest
in explaining how the mind works can benefit from reading this book, and every university library should have a copy.
Nevertheless, the book gives a somewhat misleading picture of the field of cognitive science. Computational the-
ory is indeed essential to understanding the mind, but it succeeds best when it is applied to detailed experimental
results, not just to rough intuitive ideas about mental operations. Boden does discuss psychological experiments in
her chapters on computational psychology and connectionism, but she gives little attention to the crucial role that
advances in experimental techniques have made to the development of cognitive science. Among these advances were
Wundt’s transformation of psychology into a laboratory science in the 1870s, Sternberg’s application of reaction time
measurement to cognitive tasks in the 1960s, and the dramatic results of brain scanning technologies such as fMRI in
the 1980s and 1990s. A better idea of the experimental side of cognitive science, including both behavioral and neural
experiments, can be obtained from a new textbook by psychologists Edward Smith and Stephen Kosslyn [4].
Boden wisely avoided trying to produce an encyclopedia of cognitive science, so inevitably there are a variety
of omissions that different people will deem unfortunate. She chides the field of anthropology for largely preferring
postmodernist theorizing over the kind of cognitive investigation that would give it a fuller role in understanding the
mind. But she neglects the growing body of work in cross-cultural psychology, for example by Douglas Medin and
Richard Nisbett, that helps to fill the anthropological gap in cognitive science. Critical as she is of current trends in
Chomskyan linguistic theory, she omits discussion of the opposing school of cognitive linguistics, seen in the work of
George Lakoff, Ronald Langacker, and Leonard Talmy. Post-Piagetian developmental psychology gets short shrift, as
does educational psychology, which has been a major area for successful applications of cognitive science. Overall,
however, all readers should be impressed by how much Boden has managed to include and interconnect in her history
of cognitive science, which is far more comprehensive than its only predecessor, Howard Gardner’s 1985 book [2].
Boden’s opinions will annoy some who think she undervalues research in Chomskyan linguistics, which she cas-
tigates for losing the connections with empirical psychology and computation that made Chomsky’s early ideas so
influential. She is also highly critical of Gerard Edelman’s neural Darwinism, and John Searle’s unproductive views
on intentionality. In these and many other matters, however, I think Boden’s judgment is acute. On the other hand, she
devotes inordinate attention to two areas with scant theoretical or experimental contributions to how the mind works:
continental philosophy and artificial life.
Inevitably in a work of this scope, there are a few minor historical errors. Boden repeats the oft-told story that
the term computer bug originated with an actual moth found in the Harvard Mark I by Grace Hopper. But the term
“bug” had long been used by engineers such as Edison to describe design faults [3]. Boden attributes the term “con-
nectionism” to the neuropsychologist D.O. Hebb, but it was coined a decade earlier by the learning theorist, Edward
Thorndike [6]. There is an initial attribution, corrected later, of the SOAR cognitive model to Herbert Simon rather
than Allan Newell. Overall, however, the book is a marvel of historical accuracy and insight.
In the early days of cognitive science, artificial intelligence was a major contributor to attempts to understand how
minds work. Such contributions were prominent in the 1950s, when Allen Newell and Herbert Simon produced the first
computational models of human reasoning; and AI was also prominent in the 1970s, when the interdisciplinary field of
cognitive science was officially born. In recent decades, however, most researchers in artificial intelligence have veered
away from the aim of producing human-level intelligence and have focused on narrower engineering goals. This focus
has resulted in some impressive technological successes in areas such as robotics and planning, but the concern with
practical applications has come at the expense of contributions from AI to the cognitive-science enterprise of trying
to understand how human minds work. Even if AI is more interested in engineering than psychology, it still has to
admit that humans remain far superior to available machines for most kinds of intelligence, such as problem solving,
learning, and language understanding. Can AI regain a central place in cognitive science?
Despite the major advances in computational theories of mind, there certainly remains a need for Grand Unify-
ing Theory of mental computation. Cognitive science has many important experimental results and a wealth of rich
computational hypotheses, but it still lacks the kind of broad explanatory scheme that Newton provided for physics
and Darwin provided for biology. Perhaps the Newton or Darwin of cognitive science will emerge from AI, but other
fields may be more fruitful, in particularly theoretical neuroscience, which is providing increasingly sophisticated
mathematical and computational models of how neural systems produce complex behaviors. One possible source of
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botics, cognitive psychology, and brain theory. My own hunch is that there are major theoretical principles of mental
computation yet to be discovered. These principles will need to provide an integrated picture of how mental mecha-
nisms operate at many different levels—social, cognitive, neural, and even molecular [5].
It would be unfortunate if AI’s substantial engineering successes engendered a confidence that the field can ignore
empirical studies of how human and animal minds work. AI has no general solutions to fundamental problems such as
combinatorial explosion, credit assignment, and the frame problem. The existence of humans shows that a biologically
evolved system can nevertheless operate effectively in complex changing environments. Hence I think that AI still has
a lot to learn from other fields of cognitive science, as well as a lot to contribute. Margaret Boden’s illuminating book
should be a great boon to efforts to understand mind and intelligence through interdisciplinary collaboration.
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